Financialization and Organizational Changes in Multinational Enterprises by Salento, Angelo et al.
 
Revue d'économie industrielle 
144 | 4e trimestre 2013
Manufacturing Renaissance (1/2)
Financialization and Organizational Changes
in Multinational Enterprises
Angelo Salento, Giovanni Masino and Domenico Berdicchia
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rei/5710
DOI: 10.4000/rei.5710
ISSN: 1773-0198
Publisher
De Boeck Supérieur
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 December 2013
Number of pages: 145-176
ISBN: 9782804185701
ISSN: 0154-3229
 
Electronic reference
Angelo Salento, Giovanni Masino and Domenico Berdicchia, « Financialization and Organizational
Changes in Multinational Enterprises », Revue d'économie industrielle [Online], 144 | 4e trimestre 2013,
Online since 01 December 2015, connection on 02 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
rei/5710  ; DOI : 10.4000/rei.5710 
© Revue d’économie industrielle
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 144  ➻  4 E TR IMESTRE 2013 145
FINANCIALIZATION 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
Angelo Salento (University of Salento), Giovanni Masino (University of Ferrara), 
Domenico Berdicchia (University of Ferrara)
 Mots clés : Gouvernement d’entreprise, structure financière, stratégie 
et performance.
 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Structure, Strategy and 
Performance.
1. INTRODUCTION1
How do we interpret the significant organizational transformations that 
characterized most enterprises in the last thirty years? So far, the pre-
vailing explanation is that such changes emerged as the rational answer 
to industrial and productive problems: the need to face an increasing 
instability of the goods and services markets. In this paper we propose 
a different interpretation. We argue that such transformations are bet-
ter explained by focusing on the pressure exercised by financial markets. 
We call this process “financialization” of enterprises – that is, a progres-
sive adjustment of all enterprises’ relevant dimensions (formal control, 
accounting, strategy, structures, work organization, personnel policies, 
internal culture, etc.) in order to accommodate an increasing orientation 
1 While this paper is the outcome of a shared research and reflection effort by the 
authors, the writing of the single paragraphs can be attributed in the following 
way. Angelo Salento wrote paragraphs 1, 3 and 4; Domenico Berdicchia wrote para-
graphs 5 and 6; Giovanni Masino wrote paragraphs 2, 7 and 8.
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towards financial accumulations. Many authors already noticed the devel-
opment of a sort of “paper economy” and, in parallel, an increasingly “flex-
ible” productive economy (Harvey, 1990). However, only in the last decade 
the tight connection between the two has been observed. Nonetheless, 
financialization is still a somewhat vague construct. Definitions oscillate 
between purely quantitative descriptions of how financial operations have 
surged dramatically over the years, and larger scale, system-level narra-
tives, such as the one proposed by Luciano Gallino (2011). In our perspec-
tive, the idea of “financialization of enterprises” alludes not only to the 
final outcome of a large, system-level transformation, but also to the pro-
cess that generated such outcome – that is, the normative, institutional 
and cultural mutations that built and supported a significant continuity 
between the world of production and the financial markets. It is worth 
emphasizing that we are not proposing a mono-causal, deterministic view. 
We refer to financialization as an analytical construct, which is useful in 
order to focus on one process that, together with many others, may be rel-
evant in describing and explaining the significant economic and organi-
zational changes that occurred in the last decades. In the following para-
graphs we will summarize how such construct can be utilized to explain 
organizational changes in relation to alternative narratives; we will pro-
vide an analytical framework in order to understand the possible connec-
tions between financialization and organizational changes; we will show 
the results of our empirical research, which relied on two different meth-
odologies. Finally, we will briefly discuss the results.
2. THE RHETORIC AND CRITIQUE 
OF POST-FORDISM
Post-fordism is one the key words upon which the history of social trans-
formations in the last thirty years has been narrated in social sciences 
and public discourses. Critical interpretations of the “Post-fordist” idea are 
also available. For example, there is a large movement of research and 
studies, under the label of “Critical Management Studies”, in which the 
most common apologetic representations of the Post-fordist transition are 
sharply criticized by emphasizing the strong continuity with Fordism. 
However, even these critical perspectives do not question the mainstream 
idea according to which the Post-fordist logic is essentially an industrial, 
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market-based one. In one of the most influential mainstream interpreta-
tions, Piore and Sabel (1984) proposed the idea of a radical transformation 
in which the Fordist industrial system was replaced by a new “regime”, 
thanks to a number of different processes, such as: the saturation of 
national markets – which pushed companies to globalize their opera-
tions – and the so called “double convergence” (Sabel, 1989) which lead to 
a new kind of capitalism, called by the authors “flexible specialization”. 
Even more “market-centric” and “techno-centric” is the interpretation 
provided by the managerial literature, in which the need for flexibility 
and quality paved the way for new managerial practices like Total Quality 
Management (Deming, 1986), Business Process Reengineering (Hammer, 
Champy, 1993; Short, Davenport, 1990) and Lean Production (Womack, 
James, Ross, 1990). These new practices implied a complete abandonment 
of the Fordist-Tayloristic orthodoxy: the use of teamwork instead of tasks’ 
atomization; the use of empowerment and increased responsibility for 
workers instead of direct supervision; decentralization of decision prerog-
atives instead of centralization; a focus on outcomes and the “horizontal” 
dimension of coordination instead of a focus on procedures and vertical 
control. All these major changes at various analytical levels (from “macro” 
to “micro”), under the new label of Post-Fordism, are supposed to be con-
sistent, according to the mainstream readings, to the new “requests” of 
the globalized markets and production systems. Thus, what we observe 
is largely depicted as a major, large scale industrial and organizational 
revolution, which – just like in the case of Fordism – is accompanied by 
very radical social and cultural changes as well. This is also very consis-
tent with the literature emphasizing the “network-ization” of production 
(Powell, 1990), in which companies outsource large portions of their activ-
ities in order to focus on their “core business” by managing strategically 
external networks and partners. Again, this is largely seen as a transfor-
mation in the name of industrial and organizational efficiency, supported 
by the theoretical perspective of organizational economics (Williamson, 
1986). Finally, “neo-schumpeterian” accounts (Freeman, 1984) also focus on 
market efficiency as the main drive for these changes, essentially guided 
by technological evolution and innovation.
As we already anticipated, even anti-mainstream interpretations do not 
offer a very different conceptual foundation. According to the “regulation 
school” (Amin, 1995; Boyer, 1990; Aglietta, 1979), for instance, the passage 
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from Fordism to Post-Fordism can be explained in terms of a different 
“regulation regime” which, at the same time, transformed most institu-
tions but also ensured the continuity of the capitalistic system. Again, at 
the origin of the transformation lies the crisis of mass production, which 
required new industrial and organizational arrangements. Just recently 
these authors turned their attention to the relevance of financial mar-
kets in determining this historical transformation (Aglietta, Rebérioux, 
2005; Boyer, 2011). A similar trajectory was followed by David Harvey. In 
his classic book “The Condition of Post-modernity”, the financial system 
is described as a facilitator for a demand-based transformation, which 
ultimately depends on the saturation and instability of the goods’ mar-
kets. More recently, Harvey turned his attention to financial dynamics 
as a major explanatory element (Harvey, 2005, 2010). Finally, the “Critical 
Management Studies” approach (Wilmott, Alvesson, 1992) challenges on 
multiple accounts the Post-fordist rhetoric, especially in terms of its self-
proclaimed embracing of decentralization, empowerment and democrati-
zation of the workplace. These critical interpretations focused instead on 
power as the most important concept. Companies are conceived as domi-
nation structures (Odih, Knights, 2009; Boreham, 1992). However, even the 
CMS literature puts very little emphasis on the possible relation between 
the financialization process and the Post-fordist “revolution”.
Thus, we believe there is still a fundamental interpretative gap to be 
filled. The literature is very helpful in order to better understand the 
deep, inherent contradictions and the rhetorical ambiguities that char-
acterize the current managerial practices, and the Post-fordist system 
as a whole (Masino, 2005). They are also very useful to remind us that 
power dynamics represent an essential ingredient in order to understand 
both micro-level and macro-level managerial and economic transforma-
tions. However, in this paper we propose that a careful consideration of 
the intersection between the financial and the industrial / organizational 
dimensions is crucial in order to provide a more complete, convincing and 
accurate picture of the changes that happened in the business and eco-
nomic world in the last thirty years. In the next section, we will briefly 
show some data about the relevance and the pervasiveness of the finan-
cialization phenomenon.
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3. FINANCIALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY 
AND FINANCIALIZATION OF ENTERPRISES
In a recent Critical Management Studies Conference (Naples, Italy, July 
2011) one of the tracks had the following title: “Is financialization a mean-
ingful –ization?”. For our purposes, this is a crucial question. If what we 
call financialization was not a relevant phenomenon per se, then it would 
be hard to claim its significance for the explanation of the organizational 
changes and arrangements occurring within enterprises. As we already 
stated, financialization can be conceived in different ways. A first, more 
general concept of financialization refers to the increase of the absolute 
and relative value of financial transactions, within a situation of wide-
spread de-regulation of capital movements, and to the growth of the rel-
evance of financial institutions and élites, both at the national and inter-
national level (Epstein, 2006; Palley, 2007). In other words, we refer to the 
growing importance of financial activities as sources of profits (Krippner, 
2011). This construct can be measured in a variety of ways.
Figure 1. Total value of stock trades in billions of dollars
Total WFE
Italian Stock 
Exchange 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
In figure 1, we show that the total value of stock tradesincreased by a fac-
tor of three in only ten years (it quadrupled in Italy). The total value of 
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financial products reached, in 2007, the 359% value of the world’s gross 
product, with an average increase of 9% per year since 1990. While these 
numbers seem to speak for themselves, there are different ways to inter-
pret (and measure) the general financialization of the economy. One 
could distinguish at least five somewhat different (although not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive) perspectives, focusing on different explanations, 
issues or disciplinary interests.
A first, widespread interpretation proposes the idea of financialization as 
the product of a speculation bubble. According to this view, a sort of finan-
cial branch of the economy developed autonomously from the “real” econ-
omy, guided by somewhat “irrational” or non-rational evaluations and 
expectations (Beunza, Starck, 2010; Godechot, 2000). As the goal of these 
actors is not the efficiency of the companies they invest in, but their per-
sonal wealth, behaviors based on self-fulfilling prophecies seem to emerge. 
The value of financial products increases not because of what happens in 
the “real economy”, but because of expectations about their own increase. 
That is how the enormous power of major investors is explained. They are 
able to “make” the market (to generate huge financial products’ supply 
and demand flows) and, by consequence, they control such expectations. 
Speculation bubbles are usually inflated (and/or deflated) by contingent 
situations (i.e., the introduction of a new technology), but their funda-
mental logic is related to social and psychological phenomena that are gen-
erated within the financial world, a very different mechanism from the 
traditional market equilibrium and efficiency dogma.
A second interpretation sees financialization as a systemic “answer” to 
declining industrial profits. According to this view, a shift towards a 
financial accumulation of wealth happens every time a certain economic 
system declines, for example because of the competition from other eco-
nomic systems. Thus, the shift towards financialization represents a way 
to procrastinate the crisis. In this view, the most recent financialization 
process should be interpreted as a reaction to the decline of the American 
economy, started at the end of the 1970’s under the pressure of new emer-
gent economies, such as Japan and Germany (Arrighi, 1994, 2007). Even 
Marxist interpretations are somewhat similar to these lines, even though 
the decline of profits is viewed not as the outcome of increased competi-
tion, but as the consequence of increased monopolies.
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A third point of view is somewhat similar to the previous one, but it 
emphasizes the role played by the States, since the 70’s, in determining 
the current financialization wave. Krippner (2005, 2011), in particular, 
described the significant role played by US policies in the last 40 years, 
in terms of deregulation of financial markets and other related policies 
which created  a sort of financialization “spiral”.
A fourth stream of studies sees financialization as the outcome of the dom-
ination of a new transnational capitalistic class. According to this view, the 
financial “boom” can be explained in terms of how these powerful groups 
accumulate wealth by using their power in the financial markets (Duménil, 
Lévy, 2006). This argument, clearly connected to a conflict-centered view 
of economic transformations, conceives the neo-liberist globalization of 
the economy as a “revolution from the top”, that is, a significant shift of 
power in favor of large capitalists, generating increasing social inequalities 
(Harvey, 2005; Bryan, Rafferty, 2006; Radice, 2011, Gallino, 2012).
Finally, sociological studies focused their attention on the symbolic and 
cultural dimension of the financialization process and, more generally, of 
the neo-liberist culture (Bourdieu 2000; Thrift, 2005). These studies ana-
lyze the issue of the “embeddedness” of financial accumulation through 
the observation of the mechanisms by which the idea that the main 
“object” of the economic activity is not the production of goods and ser-
vices, but the production of money, became legitimized and spread widely 
in societies (Davis, 2009).
Overall, while there are a number of different explanations and differ-
ent points of interest by various disciplines, this large scale financializa-
tion process seems to be considered by many authors as a major phenom-
enon deserving careful consideration, at all analytical levels. Indeed, one 
should ask whether the macro-level “financialization of the economy” 
(however interpreted) translates, at the micro level, into something that 
we might call the “financialization of enterprises”. With this expression 
we mean, in general terms, the tendency of enterprises (even non-finan-
cial enterprises) to increasingly rely on accumulation strategies based 
on financial means. More specifically, there are at least three different 
modalities through which such transition towards a financial accumula-
tion takes place.
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The first modality is the use of cash flow, generated by productive and 
commercial activities, for financial investments – for instance, invest-
ments in financial derivatives, re-purchase of own stocks and financing 
of mergers and acquisitions (Milberg, 2008). According to Lazonick (2010) 
in the period between 1997 and 2009, 438 companies of the S&P 500, listed 
in 1997, spent 2.7 trillion dollars for re-purchasing own stocks, on aver-
age 6.4 billion dollars each, and distributed about 2 trillion dollars in div-
idends, on average 4.6 billion each. Thus, we observe a large subtraction 
of resources from the industrial realm in order to access financial invest-
ments with relatively high profitability.
The second modality is the development of financial activities in paral-
lel with industrial ones. In this case there is no clear separation between 
the financial and the industrial activities, like in the first case. Here, the 
financial activity is a sort of “child” branch of the main industrial activ-
ity. A typical example can be found in those companies that provide finan-
cial services to their own customers who want to buy their products. This 
happened for quite a long time in industries such as the automotive and 
others. However, while in the past these financial activities were mere 
instruments for the industrial strategy of the company, today the relation-
ship is somewhat inverted. Profitability is higher in financial services, so 
that industrial activity becomes instrumental to the financial strategy. 
Goods are produced in order to sell financial services, not the other way 
around. According to Blackburn (2006), in 2003 General Electric Capital 
generated 42% of all GE Group profits. In the same year, General Motors 
and Ford generated the vast majority of their profits from leasing services. 
In 2004, General Motors Acceptance Corporation earned 2.9 billion dollars, 
which is about 80% of all General Motors Group earnings. The whole idea 
of “core business” is shifted towards the financial services and products, 
even for traditional industrial companies. 
A third modality is the increasing focus of enterprises on the goal of 
shareholder value maximization. While some may argue that this ori-
entation is inherent in the fundamental idea of “private company”, in 
the last thirty years the focus on capital gains has become exasperated. 
Indeed, the top managers’ compensation depends mostly on capital gains. 
The focus on shareholder value has dramatic consequences at many levels. 
The most visible effect is to shift the attention on the short or very short 
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term returns. As Gallino stated, this means that the wide adoption of the 
principle according to which profits are identified not just as the differ-
ence between revenues and costs but also – preferably – as the difference 
between the shares’ value at the time t2 and the value at the time t1, where 
the difference between t2 and t1 can be as short as just a few days (Gallino, 
2005). A corollary to this approach is the priority given to shareholders’ 
interests over any other stakeholders’ interests. The idea of the company 
as a social institution, embedded in a social context, is thus dissolved.
It should be noticed that the financialization of enterprises is not a recent 
phenomenon. Fligstein (1990) showed that at least two different “eras” of 
enterprises’ financialization can be identified. The first one, in which the 
company is conceived as a portfolio of investments, was introduced by a 
new generation of financially trained managers. The company is not seen 
as a unitary production system, but as a set of product lines generating 
cash flow which can be de-composed and re-composed in any way in order 
to get the best possible return on investments. This concept maintained its 
prevalence until the 80’s and, in some countries (in Italy, for example) at 
least until the early 90’s. In the second “era” of financialization, starting 
in the 80’s in the US and then spread in other countries, the idea of share-
holder value maximization was asserted as the new dogma, a new way to 
conceive and control the business enterprise.
However, while the essential aspects of enterprises’ financialization are 
quite clear from a qualitative point of view, it is surprisingly difficult 
to find any aggregate data about it. According to Palley (2007), the total 
profit of financial companies was 25.7% of the profits of non-financial 
companies in the 1970s, but the ratio increased to 49.7% in the year 2000. 
In addition, according to OECD data, the added value of the financial sec-
tor as a percentage of the added value of all sectors increased rapidly and 
steadily between 1970 and 2007 in most OECD countries. In the US, the 
increase went from about 18% to well over 32%. In Germany, it went from 
about 13% to about 28%. Similar trends can be observed in Spain, Italy and 
France. These data clearly show the shift in the production of wealth from 
the industrial sector to the financial sector. However, the most interesting 
data is provided by Kippner (2011), showing the dramatic increase of finan-
cial income vs. industrial income in non-financial companies (Figure 2). 
This chart clearly illustrates the dramatic financialization process of non-
financial companies.
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Figure 2. Percentage of financial profits over total cash flow  
in non-financial companies in the US
Source: Krippner (2011, page?).
Thus, it seems safe to argue that the qualitative and quantitative relevance 
of the financialization process – both as a macro-level and a micro-level 
phenomenon – can be hardly neglected. Indeed, a large literature offered 
many theoretical accounts, from various disciplines and points of view. 
In this paragraph we could only scratch the surface of the several debates 
about the various topics related to the financialization theme. However, 
the current literature does not seem to explore in sufficient detail a very 
simple but important question, that is, whether financialization is hav-
ing any role in shaping the organizational choices of companies. There are 
some exceptions, of course (Lazonick, O’Sullivan, 2000) but there seems 
to be a clear need for more empirical research specifically guided by orga-
nizational analytical categories. As we already argued previously, avail-
able explanations of the Post-fordist paradigm (both apologetic and critical 
ones) seem to focus on concepts and analysis mostly based on an “indus-
trial” logic. Instead, we need to understand if and how the so called “Post-
fordist” way of conceiving, managing and organizing companies can be 
at least partially explained in terms of the current financialization pro-
cess. In the next paragraphs we propose, through the support of empiri-
cal data, that considering a context of widespread financialization (at all 
levels) greatly helps to explain why and how enterprises are managed and 
organized as they are today.
FINANCIALIZATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE ➻  N° 144  ➻  4 E TR IMESTRE 2013 155
4. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A few authors identified some of the main strategic and organizational 
features that characterize financially-oriented companies (Lazonick, 
O’Sullivan, 2000). The most important ones are: i) the tendency to aban-
don long-term programs and plans; ii) the use of financial mechanisms in 
order to increase the shares’ value; iii) the tendency to replace technical 
managers with managers trained to have a financial orientation; iv) the 
use of large sums of money to cover agency costs; v) the widespread use of 
mergers and acquisitions; vi) the reduction of profits coming from produc-
tion and sales of goods and services; vii) the reduction of labor costs and 
the substitution of fixed costs with variable costs. While these findings 
are generally accurate, a more detailed and complete analysis of the rela-
tionships connecting these and other strategic and organizational charac-
teristics with the financialization process seems to be necessary. In order 
to explore such connections in more depth, we based our empirical inves-
tigation on an analytical framework proposed by Maggi (2001, 2003). The 
author identifies three analytical levels (from micro to macro): the work 
situation (work organization and other coordination and control arrange-
ments in the workplace), the general configuration of the company (over-
all formal structure, general organizational and human resource policies) 
and the external relations with other organizations (outsourcing policies 
and other inter-organizational arrangements).
We start from the “meso” (intermediate) level. Contrary to what is almost 
unanimously claimed by the mainstream literature on Post-fordism, it 
seems unlikely that the financialization of enterprises allows decentral-
ized formal structures. On the contrary, a focus on short-term, financial 
results requires a very strong emphasis on centralization of competences 
and, even more, of decision making prerogatives. As we will see in the 
next sections, the CEO (or, even better, the CFO) of a centralized company 
is able to control quickly and directly all the relevant operational “lever-
ages” in order to adjust the financial results of the company and, by con-
sequence, to meet the short term expectations of the financial markets. 
The short term orientation requires the ability to act quickly and precisely 
towards certain kinds of outcomes. Thus, a high degree of centralization 
of formal configurations is what we expect to find in financially ori-
ented companies. Another relevant aspect is the tendency to “restructure” 
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and “reengineer” the organization – practices which literally boomed in 
the 80’s and 90’s, but still continue today, although with different labels 
(“downsizing” or, more euphemistically, “rightsizing”). The practices 
to decrease the size of operations, to reduce labor, to focus on the “core 
business” – usually justified in terms of rationalization of production – 
respond to precise financial needs. When the company is managed as a 
portfolio of activities, the goal is to maintain only those activities that are 
best suited to generate the highest return on equity, as demanded by the 
financial markets.
Thus, overall, at this analytical level we expect to observe a strong ten-
dency to centralize formal structures, to downsize operations and to 
increase the relevance of financially trained managers.
At the “micro” level (the work situation) a company conceived as a finan-
cial mechanism, that is, a nexus of contracts, according the terminology 
of the agency theory (Jensen, Meckling, 1976) will show a tendency to de-
structure the organic relationship between workers and managers. The 
volatility of the financial capital is accompanied by the precariousness 
of work – that is, the continuous adjustment of “human resources” to the 
financial needs of the company. The goal is to reduce labor costs and to 
transform fixed costs into variable costs. The Post-fordist rhetoric empha-
sizes the relevance of workers’ initiative and the intrinsic “value” of peo-
ple. Indeed, their initiative and knowledge is requested (within the limits 
of allowed discretion), but it is immediately acquired as a system’s prop-
erty, it is de-personalized and generalized. In other words, the goal is to 
make every person as replaceable as possible. In this context, the precari-
ousness of work contracts is the key to this new production modality. The 
workers (both at the operational and at the middle management level) are 
treated as internal “customers”. As mere “contractors” with the company, 
without any real organic “citizenship”, they are the target of significant 
internal communication (and training) initiatives aimed at maintaining a 
decent level of motivation in order to get an adequate work performance. 
Even the higher level managers are under the double pressure towards 
commitment and competence on the one hand, and responsiveness to 
the financial imperatives on the other hand. A sort of “schizophrenic” 
condition (as we will see later in more detail) in which managers, while 
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appearing more powerful than ever, instead seem to suffer from a reduc-
tion of actual autonomy.
Thus, overall, at the work situation level we expect to see a general effort to 
increase the workers’ condition as “replaceable parts”, to increase motiva-
tion and commitment through pervasive communication and training pol-
icies, to reduce the autonomy of middle and even higher level managers,to 
reduce labor costs and to transform fixed labor costs into variable costs.
At the third level – the inter-organizational one – the outsourcing prac-
tices are usually explained in terms of transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1986). In managerial terms, this is described as the attempt 
to emphasize and focus on firms’ “distinctive” capabilities and competen-
cies. This kind of explanation, though, is not always accurate. Indeed, one 
might argue that very often it is hard to justify all the inefficiencies (even 
in terms of coordination and integration difficulties) that these opera-
tions actually imply. Instead, the big wave of outsourcing and external-
ization operations of the 1990s seems to be better explained by financial 
motives. These are operations that provide great financial advantages in 
the short term, as they generate large amounts of cash, which are then 
reinvested in financial operations. They are also remunerative in terms 
of shareholder value, as they are very appreciated by the financial mar-
kets. It should also be added that externalization and outsourcing opera-
tions, with their extended dynamics of inter-organizational dependencies 
and control, tend to bring to the world of small and medium enterprises 
the same financial logic to which the large enterprises are exposed. Thus, 
the whole value chain becomes dependent on the same financially ori-
ented “rules” as they penetrate the boundaries of SMEs, not just in cul-
tural terms but also in operational terms.
In the next paragraphs, we will illustrate our empirical evidence consist-
ing of two different sets of data. In the first one, we analyzed a significant 
number of case studies from a variety of multinational enterprises. In the 
second one, we will report in-depth qualitative interviews with very high 
level managers.
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We based the first part of our empirical work on text materials gener-
ated by a well known Italian Research Program called “Officina di 
Organizzazione” (Organizational Workshop)2. The Program produced so far 
about 150 case studies concerning many large multinational companies. 
Overall, more than 70 different companies participated to the Program, 
many of them for several years – in fact, some of them participated for 
15 years or more. The case studies concern a variety of areas: formal struc-
tural changes, outsourcing initiatives, human resource management prac-
tices, mergers and acquisitions, work organization, technological changes, 
etc. All cases have a specific organizational and human resource manage-
ment focus. Each case study is the outcome of a full day of work where 
a manager (usually a very high level manager in the organizational or 
human resource area of the company) presents to his peers (other man-
agers, with similar positions, from other companies) a case of organiza-
tional transformation in his company, normally a very significant project 
that he managed personally. The presentations are very detailed, and they 
last three to four hours. After that, a session of questions and answers 
is carried out, followed by an open discussion session where all partici-
pants analyze, criticize and discuss the case study presented by the man-
ager of the company. Thus, the whole day is focused on one case only. This 
ensures a high level of focus and detail. Researchers do not actively par-
ticipate in the presentations or discussions – their only role is to facilitate 
and coordinate the whole process. Everything is tape-recorded and reports 
are then written by researchers who attended the event. No information 
is published in any way without the companies’ consent. A few aspects 
make this data source particularly interesting and, in many ways, unique.
First, the topic of each case study is chosen by the company itself. The 
company’s manager chooses what project(s) or initiative(s) to talk about, 
depending on what he/she thinks is relevant in his company at that 
moment. There is no external influence or bias on the topic selection or 
on the way managers present their cases. They enjoy complete freedom. 
Needless to say, discussions are as free and as open as the presentations.
2 For details about the Research Program, please see www.taoprograms.org/
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Second, all the researchers who prepare the reports put a lot of care and 
attention in order to make sure that the reports are as faithful as possi-
ble to the narrative of the managers. All key elements – like the language, 
the examples, the topics and sub-topics, the overall narrative – are all left 
untouched by the researchers, who are mere “collectors” of textual evi-
dence from the companies’ managers. Reports are usually 20 to 30 pages 
long.
Third, it is worth noting that managers present to (and discuss with) an 
audience of peers. The events are not public. They strictly involve only a 
close circle of managers who end up knowing each other quite well and 
are willing to participate (often, for many years in a row) in order to 
openly discuss and compare what is happening in their respective com-
panies. Thus, presentations and discussions are usually quite transparent 
and frank. 
All case studies are very homogeneous in all the above mentioned aspects.
In this paper we focus on all case studies available (57) from 1995 to 2008. 
The reason is that in 1995 one author of this paper started being involved 
in the Research Program, so he could be present in all the events. We also 
decided not to include more recent cases in order to avoid the possibil-
ity that the current economic crisis would bias the results. About 18% out 
of the 57 cases concern enterprises of the financial sector (banks, insur-
ance companies, etc), 33% concern manufacturing companies (automotive, 
chemical, energy, etc.), 30% concern service firms (mostly large retailers), 
and 19% concern firms from the technology industry (computing, soft-
ware, telecommunications, etc.). All companies are very large multina-
tional firms, with headquarters in a variety of western countries. It is 
worthwhile noticing that the inclusion of financial companies (banks, 
insurance companies, etc.) is justified by the observation that the orga-
nizational consequences of “financialization” can also be observed in 
this sector. Just like any other sector, financial companies may be pushed 
towards short-termism, centralization, marginalization of labor, etc., by 
their increasing dependence on financial markets. One can distinguish 
between an “industrial” logic and a “financial” logic even in the finan-
cial sector.
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In this paper we present the results obtained by using a thematic analysis 
approach. After several rounds of reading and evaluating all the reports, 
we defined a structure of “thematic codes”. Codes were defined qualita-
tively. Overall, we defined 53 codes divided in 7 different groups. Each 
group represents a general area of organizational themes. Each code iden-
tifies a specific theme.
The Groups are the following: General goals of the company, Macro-level 
organizational transformations, Micro-level organizational transforma-
tions, Human Resource Management policies and initiatives, ICT-related 
organizational transformations, changes about Suppliers and other 
External Actors relations, Organizational Culture. While we recognize 
that the choice of codes is purely arbitrary, it is worth considering that the 
final coding structure was chosen after several rounds of careful, cross-
examination of all cases, in order to define codes that actually reflected 
the content of the reports. In other words, we tried to decrease, as much 
as possible, the influence of the researchers’ perspective and interests in 
defining the coding structure. Of course, such subjective influence can-
not be completely eradicated, so the outcome still has to be interpreted as 
somewhat arbitrary.
Each report was then “coded”. More precisely, a number of excerpts (text 
segments) of each report were identified and associated to one or more 
codes depending on their meaning and content. Once again, the coding 
process is purely arbitrary as well. However, we performed a practice of 
cross-coding in order to consider only the excerpts in which all authors 
agreed on the coding. Overall, we identified 790 text segments for the 
57 cases (on average, almost 14 excerpts per case study). We did not code 
any accessory elements to the case studies, but we coded only informa-
tion that specifically referred to the actual organizational transforma-
tion discussed in the report (for example, no reference to past changes or 
other companies was coded). One brief example of a codified segment is 
the following:
“The project team decided to develop a unified, centralized system (a Single Global HR 
System), in order to achieve a shared management of data, and also in order to allow 
the headquarter to control what was happening in the periphery, and to standardize 
some of the most important work processes.”
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This text segment was coded with the “Centralization” and the “Work 
Standardization” codes, because these are the key concepts conveyed by 
the segment, according to our interpretation.
While multiple coding for the same text segment was widely used, we 
tried to avoid multiple coding related to the same information – in other 
words, we tried to avoid to code different segments with the same code 
when they referred to same information. For example, the segment above 
was not coded with the “Unification of ICT systems” code (although it does 
imply that such process happened in the company) because in the same 
report there are other segments referring more specifically and exten-
sively about the same event. Overall, a total of 1231 codes have been applied 
– on average, about 1.5 codes per segment, and 21.5 codes per case study. We 
used a software application called “Dedoose” for all the coding operations.
The goal of our analysis is an exploratory, descriptive one. We are not 
attempting to test any quantitative hypothesis. Our aim is to identify 
some general patterns of organizational change in large multinational 
companies in the last 15 years. We are not claiming in any way that the 
patterns that we identified have general validity. In order to understand 
what could be the extent of their significance it is necessary to clearly 
point out both the strength and limitations of our data and methodology.
As far as strengths are concerned, we believe that our set of case studies is 
quite unique in terms of number of companies, variety of industries, eco-
nomic and cultural importance of the companies, level of detail, homoge-
neity in their construction and, most of all, faithfulness to what the man-
agers freely choose to describe (content, language, emphasis, etc.). Thus, 
this data set provides an interesting opportunity to study what is happen-
ing in large companies starting from the narrative used by the managers 
themselves in order to explain, describe and rationalize their own work. 
It should also be mentioned that the Research Program that generated the 
data is solely concerned with organizational changes. In other words, no 
specific request whatsoever was ever made to the managers in order to 
make them talk about financial issues.
As far as limitations are concerned, 57 cases – while being a very high 
number for qualitative studies – is probably not high enough to allow a 
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reliable quantitative approach to pattern-finding, although we are going 
to explore such possibility in future works. Also, the thematic analysis 
approach is sensitive to the researcher’s own perspective and subjectivity. 
As we already stated above, while we tried to limit the “subjectivity” prob-
lem through cross-coding, the fact that most interpretive choices are arbi-
trary cannot be denied and should be carefully considered.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
AND FINANCIALIZATION OF ENTERPRISES: 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The first, most basic question we would like to try to answer is the follow-
ing: what are the themes appearing most often in organizational change 
processes of large multinational companies? In figure 3, the 12 codes (out of 
53 total codes) appearing more frequently, and their percentage of appear-
ances on the total number of code apps (1231), are shown.
The most frequent code is “Efficiency”, which was applied every time the 
managers stressed the idea of reducing costs. “Centralization” is the sec-
ond most frequent code, applied every time the managers talked about 
centralizing their formal structures. These are significant percentages, if 
we consider that, out of 53 different codes, 31 obtained a percentage of 
appearance lower than 2%, and 22 lower than 1% each. In other words, 
some themes are five or six times more frequent than others. It is also use-
ful to measure the “diffusion” of each theme (that is, in how many cases 
each code appears at least once). “Efficiency” appeared at least once in 72% 
of case studies. “Centralization” appeared in 53% of cases. Also the theme 
“Performance” (which was applied every time the manager referred to 
financial results) is one the highest codes in terms of diffusion (40% of 
cases). The wide diffusion of codes such as “Efficiency” and “Performance” 
is particularly striking if we consider that all case studies were focused 
on organizational issues or human resource management issues (not on 
financial or accounting issues), and that the managers involved all came 
from the organizational or human resources areas. 
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Figure 3. Overall frequencies of codes
It is also interesting to notice the relevance of “Centralization”. This can 
be associated with another very frequent code, “Simplification” (which 
was applied every time the managers talked about organizational arrange-
ments aimed at simplifying or reducing the complexity of their formal 
structures). Such code is the fifth (out of 53) in terms of overall frequency, 
and fourth in terms of diffusion (it appears at least once in 54% of all 
cases). If we consider the intermediate analytical level that we introduced 
in the previous paragraph, these two themes are by far the most relevant 
in our analysis. The centralization – simplification “duo” portrays a situ-
ation in which enterprises are pushing towards highly centralized struc-
tures, in which control is concentrated in the hands of just a few top level 
managers, where simplification allows to both reduce organizational costs 
and to make the “command and control” approach more effective as the 
whole company becomes more responsive to top level decisions.
We can also compare two opposite themes, “Centralization and 
Decentralization”. In figure 4, we reported the trends that we found in our 
analysis. It is worth remembering that in the current mainstream rheto-
ric about Post-fordism, decentralization is depicted as the most important 
and distinctive features of these supposedly “new” enterprises.
As figure 4 shows, the “Decentralization” theme does not attract manager’s 
attention at all, while “Centralization” not only is one of the most debated 
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topics, but it seems to be increasingly popular among managers, in the 
last few years. It is worth repeating that our data do not have any statis-
tical significance, and these charts are just a convenient way to represent 
evidence from a large number of qualitative case studies. Nonetheless, 
it seems that our evidence shows a certain consistency to what is pos-
sible to hypothesize about how financialization creates new constraints 
for the organizational choices of firms. The same can be shown if we 
look at themes that concern the “micro” level of analysis. The code called 
“Empowerment” (which was applied every time the managers talked 
about initiatives aimed at increasing the autonomy and the responsibility 
of workers and the enrichment and enlargement of jobs) only appears in 
11% of cases, and its absolute frequency is only 1.1%. Also, if we look at the 
time series, it seems that the interest for empowerment initiatives is rap-
idly decreasing in the last few years. 
Figure 4. Centralization vs. Decentralization time series
We also tried to categorize our sample of case studies by general type of 
industry or sector: financial sector (banks, insurance companies etc.), ser-
vices sector (mostly large retailers), high-tech sector (telecommunication, 
electronics, computers etc.), and other manufacturing sectors (automo-
biles and other traditional industries). In table 5 we show the 4 most fre-
quent codes for each sector.
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Table 5. The four most frequent codes for each macro-sector
FINANCIAL % MANUFACT. % SERVICES % HI-TECH %
Training 9.1% Centralization 6.6% Efficiency 9.9% Roles 7.4%
ICT Unification 7.5% Training 5.6% Simplification 7.0% Assessment 7.4%
Assessment 6.4% Simplification 5.2% Roles 6.1% Centralization 5.9%
Standardization 5.9% Efficiency 5.0% Centralization 5.8% Efficiency 4.4%
In the financial and the manufacturing sectors, training and education 
have a prominent role. This is not the case in the services and hi-tech sec-
tors. At first sight, this could seem somewhat surprising, as it is usually 
believed that in high-tech and services companies human capital is mostly 
relevant. However, the contradiction is solved if we look at the possible 
goals of these training initiatives.
In the financial sector, besides the focus on training, the emphasis is on 
themes such us the integration and unification of information systems, 
on the assessment of people and work standardization. This is very con-
sistent with what is clearly happening in many financial enterprises: the 
organizational arrangements are more and more dependent on technol-
ogy-driven coordination and control mechanisms, and on work standard-
ization aimed at accommodating the new computerized procedures. A 
high level manager of a major bank participating to our research program 
effectively summarized this idea in the following way: “In our industry, 
the organization is the information system”. Thus, training and education 
policies, within this kind of context,clearly are not aimed at emphasizing 
the value of people’s competencies and skills, but at converting and adapt-
ing their behavior to the requirements of the technological backbone of 
the company. It is a matter of people homologation rather than people 
development.
In the manufacturing sector the relevance of training should also be 
interpreted in relation to the centralization and cultural homologation 
tendency. As we can see from the table, in this sector the emphasis on cen-
tralization is particularly high. However, centralization is probably not 
enough to ensure a high level of compliance. In order to maximize the need 
to control, formal means are not sufficient, and informal means (such as 
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training can be) are necessary as well. Indeed, it is interesting to notice 
that the code “Cultural Homogeneity” (which was applied every time the 
managers talked about initiatives related to internal communication or 
other similar actions aimed at improving the homogeneity of behaviors) 
is one with the most rapidly increasing frequency in the last few years. 
Thus, while centralization (formal control) is still at the top of managers’ 
priorities, informal control is becoming more and more relevant.
The results concerning the high-tech sector may seem the most surpris-
ing ones. Again, centralization and efficiency play a major role, while 
the mainstream ideas about these sectors is one where themes like team-
work, innovation, decentralization, autonomy and human capital are sup-
posed to be the most important ones. Instead, it seems that the mana-
gerial interest is mostly focused, even in this sector, in aspects such as 
efficiency rather than innovation, centralization rather than decentral-
ization, formal role definitions and formal assessment rather than auton-
omy and people development. This is not to say that innovation, knowl-
edge and human capital are not important in high-tech sector. However, it 
seems reasonable to hypothesize that the increasing pressure from finan-
cial markets is pushing even these companies to change their organiza-
tional and human resources practices in order to accommodate for a much 
higher attention to the short term outcomes and financial results.
7. THE POINT OF VIEW OF MANAGERS
Nothing is more telling than the vivid stories and points of view of the real 
protagonists. For our research, we decided to conduct in-depth interviews 
with some senior top-level managers (in the organizational and human 
resources areas) with a long experience in major multinational enter-
prises, in various sectors. Unfortunately, we cannot report the full inter-
views in this paper for lack of space, but the excerpts provided here repre-
sent very well their points of view3. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that 
all managers that we interviewed agreed with the general idea that finan-
cialization is a very influential phenomenon, even for decisions concerning 
3 An extended report and commentary about these interviews can be found in Salento 
and Masino (2013).
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the organizational choices and personnel management. Indeed, we found, 
in more than one occasions, that the managers quite sharply criticize how 
financialization is changing the “face” of current organizations and man-
agement as a “profession” as well.
The first manager (manager A) was a senior, top level organization man-
ager who spent his entire career in a major multinational oil company. He 
retired just a few years ago. The second manager (manager B) is a senior, 
top level, human resource manager who, in the last 20 years, has had sev-
eral experiences in a variety of multinational companies of different indus-
tries (automotive, chemical-pharmaceutical, mining). The third manager 
(manager C) was a senior organization manager in a very high level posi-
tion of a automotive multinational company. He also retired just a few years 
ago. The fourth witness is a senior consultant (consultant D) who worked 
for several decades with a large number of major companies in the field of 
organizational change, work organization and human resources.
7.1. At the “meso” level: changes in general 
organizational structures and logic
The first issue we want to tackle with our interviewees is the following: 
does it make any sense to talk about an emerging change in the funda-
mental orientation of the organizational and strategic choices? Is it possi-
ble to identify a shift in the overall logic, from an industrial to a financial 
one? Our witnesses have no doubt about it. Let us start with manager A, 
talking about his experience in a major multinational oil company which, 
in the mid 90s, was listed on the stock market. This was the beginning of 
significant changes in the company: “The CEO realized that our numbers were 
worsened by some sectors. Our debts were heavy, the cash flow was low. We decided to 
create a central unit that had to manage the outsourcing. This worked out well, as it 
allowed to reduce debts, increase the cash flow and focus on the core business […] this 
reduction of the industrial apparatus responded to the need a sort of “organizational 
cleaning” and strategic positioning, in order to recuperate a financial situation that 
would allow us to be listed in the stock exchange” (Manager A).
From an organizational point of view, the most significant changes hap-
pened during the ten years after the initial listing: “Everything changed. 
Beforehand, in this company […] there was a strong sense of identity, generations of 
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people that worked to charismatic manager who really represented so much for every-
body. Our “flag” was our technical excellence, that was the shared value […] This 
emphasis changed. The shares’ increase in value was very much appreciated by the 
management, as part of our compensation depended on that[…] We used to say in our 
company: how it is possible that we have worse financial indicators than our competi-
tors – for example, the earnings per share indicator? We need to be aligned to our com-
petitors about these and other elements that determine the stock price. We need to cut 
costs. Others did it through mergers and acquisitions, we need to do it through internal 
growth and synergies. This was the strong mandate of the CEO in those years.”
In the last 5 years, even more significant things happened: “Since 2005, a 
financial approach has become more and more relevant. There are many examples. 
The choice of high level people is one of them. A relatively young man coming from the 
financial sector, from another company, was placed in a very high level position with 
industrial responsibilities. This, just a few years before, was absolutely unthinkable. 
Also, the strategic planning approach was dismantled. The long term guidance of the 
company was weakened, and a CFO (Chief Financial Officer) role was established for 
the first time. The CFO takes on administrative, financial, insurance, accounting and 
M&A responsibilities. The strategic plan is no longer defined by the specialized unit, 
but by the CFO himself. The CFO becomes the key governance role of the company, and 
his background is a financial one.”
Even Manager C tells a similar story from his experience in a major auto-
motive company: “Financial control become more and more important, very rich of 
indicators and tools, and it is more and more integrated with accounting. The financial 
“reading” overlaps with the industrial one. Until the 1970s we didn’t have a CFO, and 
then gradually, once we created a financial direction, the unit became closer and closer 
to the CEO, and the same goes for the ICT unit […] The CFO becomes very important: he 
has to find the money, to control the use of the invested capital by product lines, coun-
try, division, business. Indeed, today we talk about CFOO (Chief Financial Operating 
Officer), a real business manager, someone who has to put the money where there are 
more returns. This is my experience” (Manager C).
Manager B is even more explicit about his experience in the chemical-
pharmaceutical industry. He focuses on the short-term orientation, which 
becomes a sort of obsession: “The problem is that investors have no brains of their 
own, even if they don’t invest really just to sell, nonetheless they are deeply influenced 
by the investment groups. The quarterly report is the bible, quarter after quarter […]. 
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In those times of the year when you have the short-term obsession, you have to do 
anything to save the short term results, in order to save your ability to manage the 
long term you need to show short-term results, you are caught in this schizophrenic 
dilemma. Even those companies that claim to be more “strategic”, they are not. This 
is the reality of most listed companies. It’s a balancing act between the long and the 
short term […]. First we talk about vision, human resource development etc., and the 
next month we observe “primordial” reactions […]. I have to fire people on which I 
invested just a month before for their growth and development […]. This inconsis-
tency creates tensions between people. And when you have strong tensions, you aban-
don long term projects. If you have bad results for two quarters you don’t care about 
the “vision”, you manage the long term with short term decisions, and that is irratio-
nal […]. If the shareholder asks a lot of dividends, this influences a lot the HR man-
ager and his choices. Also, the short term shareholder may be interested in selling, not 
just dividends” (Manager B).
Another interesting aspect concerns the managerial actions and decision 
as communication acts towards the financial markets, in order to reassure 
them, to show “activism” and competence, to show that the management 
is “in control”. Again, manager B: “We sold businesses just to show that we were 
reacting. We bought businesses just because we thought that the stock market might 
like it. Management choices became a way to communicate to the financial community 
– for example, to save the quarter. We had to show investors that we were doing some-
thing, that we were cutting costs.” Here is Manager A, on the same topic: “The 
nee CEO gave a lesson about shares’ value, and he stressed that it depends 50% on the 
actual results, and 50% on how we communicate those results. Hence, the great rele-
vance given to external communication, many people were hired in this area, a com-
plete managerial renewal, at many levels.”
Organizational choices are strictly related to all these issues. And central-
ization is by far the most frequent one. Here is what Manager B has to say 
about it: “Centralization allows to “pilot” the company just like it was a game, like 
with a joystick. If I want to steer the management according to what the Stock Market 
is asking, I need a centralized approach, decentralization does not allow me to do it. 
Centralization is directly connected to what I call “CEOization”, because CEOs must 
appear on the market not as someone who just defines general directives, but as some-
one who acts and does things, someone who is able to tightly control the company […]. 
In multinational companies, centralization is a very widespread, constant tendency, 
even if there’s always someone claiming that we need to decentralize, but companies 
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usually centralize. In the pharmaceutical company where I worked for so many years, 
this tendency was extremely obvious. More or less the same thing happens here, in the 
company where I work today (in the mining industry). Today I can do from the center 
things that 3 years ago were unthinkable, for example, I can decide where to place and 
move people even in very remote units, thanks to a sophisticated, centralized system 
of talent management and also thanks to new technologies. Technology helps because 
everything becomes remote, it gives me all the data I need. Everything is easier.”
Thus, centralization is useful for two reasons: i) it ensures that the com-
pany is very responsive, in a quick and direct way, to the top managers’ 
decisions which, in turn, depend on the short-term expectations of the 
financial market; ii) it represents the best way to communicate to the 
financial market that the top managers are able to control the company 
without hesitations or compromises. In a way, centralization represents 
a sort of organizational “insurance” for the financial markets that the 
company is and will be managed according to their short-term interests. 
Manager A also puts a lot of emphasis on centralization: “Since the beginning 
of the 90’s, the pursue of efficiency happened through a number of centralization proj-
ects of activities and service that, beforehand, were performed within each business 
unit. The first project concerned the financial activities, that were completely central-
ized. Then a project about R&D and the unification of the technology development – 
that is, a number of assessment activities were centralized, and a committee for the 
coordination of common resources and technological development themes was created. 
Another project concerned the centralization of the information technology manage-
ment. Human resources management was also mostly centralized, as well all the insur-
ance area, which for the company is very important. Recently the remaining admin-
istrative prerogatives that were left in the business division have been centralized as 
well ..thus, overall, in the last 15 years, we had this strong focus on costs reduction 
through actions that were guided by the idea of unification and integration – the key-
word was centralization. This is my experience: efficiency and centralization.”
7.2. At the “micro” level: changes in the workplace
Financialization influences micro-organizational choices in many ways. 
First and foremost, the obsession for cost reductions strongly pushes 
towards dramatic decreases of labor costs. Here is manager A: “In the last 
15 years my company reduced dramatically the overall number of employees, about 
30%, but even 50% or more in certain countries.” The “downsizing” policies are 
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widespread, often connected to operations such as mergers and acquisi-
tions, process reengineering, changes in personnel policies and so forth. 
Consultant D worked for many years with major companies in the areas of 
training & education and work organization. He emphasizes a decreasing 
attention and interest by managers to workers’ knowledge and competen-
cies: “Years ago managers were aware of this “unknown area” between organization 
and work, where the workers’ knowledge was absolutely crucial, they knew it was cru-
cial and they wanted to understand it […]. A personnel manager used to travel, used 
to go were the problems were, we talked about the problems in the workplace. Today 
managers are very far from the problems. They don’t care about the idea of under-
standing the workplace. They care about the external world, how to bring in resources. 
They see the company as global investment […]. They do ask us to do training to the 
workforce, but they don’t really care about the analysis, all they want is results. They 
assume that everything is understood already, so they ask for results, but this is not 
the way it works” (Consultant D).
In other words, the financialized company does not look at the workplace 
as a source of knowledge to improve processes or to achieve innovation. 
Instead, the company requires immediate results, and even training is 
conceived as the application of predetermined notions and models, based 
on the assumption that the “one best way” not only exists, but it is already 
well known. Again, Consultant D: “There is no recognition for understanding 
the specific training needs of the people. Today companies pay a certain educational 
agency, they go there and provide their courses without even considering the idea of 
analyzing the specific training needs. It’s all pre-packaged. The context doesn’t matter 
anymore.” Also, on the way people are considered in the workplace: “Even 
the term ‘human resources’ is financialized, because people are ‘resources’, they are 
‘production factors’, they can be replaced anytime. Once, we had ‘experts’ in the work-
place, not resources” (Consultant D).
Education and training (personnel development) is de-materialized, it is 
just a cost, not an investment. It is not a learning process which depends 
heavily on the context, it is a predefined package of notions transmitted 
to the workers and aimed at homogenizing and controlling their behavior. 
Manager C is explicit about this: “Today the relationship with people is different. 
There are no more significant investments on people. The organization is very variable. 
We have teams and interfunctional units and relations, all mediated by the informa-
tion system. The job of the personnel manager is to have a direct relationship with only 
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a small part of the personnel, the ‘talents’. They are the ones on which the company 
makes investments. And then you have the “mass” of people, which is smaller (because 
in the meanwhile I reduced the employees by a factor of four or five) but it still a mass. 
And the mass can be controlled through hierarchy. Thus, the relationship between the 
person and the company is de-materialized” (Manager C).
This tendency to a polarization between an “élite” of talents, and a mass 
of anonymous, replaceable workers is very interesting, and it well repre-
sents how a financialized company sees the personnel management prob-
lem. Investments on people do not disappear, but they are concentrated 
on a small selection of “talents”. All others are just “resources” to be con-
trolled and / or costs to be cut in order to improve the financial results. 
7.3. At the “macro” level: outsourcing and inter-
organizational choices
As we already argued, outsourcing initiatives are usually described as a 
way to rationalize industrial operations. However, financial goals can also 
be very relevant: transformation of fixed costs into variable costs, increase 
of liquidity to be invested in financial operations, and so forth. Manager C 
agrees on the possibility of different interpretations: “First, outsourcing can 
be a way to focus on the core business, or to reduce the internal complexity. But it also 
can be seen as way to generate cash and increase the shareholders value or to engage 
in financial operations. These are very different ways to see the issue, and they refer 
to the basic question: ‘what kind of company are we thinking about’”? (Manager C). 
In some cases, Manager’s C experience shows that these operations may 
go well beyond an industrial rationalization logic: “The assumption should 
be that I outsource activities to someone who has the competencies to do them well. 
In my experience, this was not always the case. The assessment of suppliers was not 
always very accurate and verified. In some cases, we outsource some ‘pieces’ to some 
suppliers who were not really able to deal with them” (Manager C). Also, there 
is the risk of losing competences. Not just because the knowledge about 
external activities cannot be accessed directly, but also because the need 
to directly and tightly control the suppliers (through information system, 
procedures, logistics or other informal means) may reduce their autonomy 
and their ability to experiment, learn and innovate. Manager C agrees on 
this: “Absolutely, this is one of the main problems of the networked company […]. 
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Especially when there is a technological change, this is a real risk. When the technol-
ogy is stable, this is not a major issue” (Manager C).
Another issue concerns the development of financial services in parallel to 
the industrial activities, as we already described in previous paragraphs. 
The boundary between what is “core” and what is “non-core” becomes very 
blurry. Again, Manager C: “There are new logic, new tools. This can become a cru-
cial issue for many companies. This is because if I have a cash problem, the market will 
not forgive you, the quarterly report becomes crucial […]. For example, the financial 
services to the customers… you need to understand if this a service to the customer 
or a business in itself. In the company I worked for this is an old issue. When we had 
our won financial unit, we had infinite discussions […] but at the Corporate level the 
financial unit was considered an autonomous business, so the Holding manages busi-
ness units and financial units just like a portfolio of investments” (Manager C).
Thus, even at the macro-level, the financial orientation seems to be very 
influential in how the outsourcing initiatives are planned, how the rela-
tionships with the suppliers are managed and how the relation between 
industrial businesses and financial businesses define the “identity” itself 
of the company.
Overall, our interviews confirm, at least from the vantage point of view 
of our interviewees, a clear shift from a general industrial strategic logic 
to a financial one. This leads to short-termism, to organizational choices 
that seem to contradict the general industrial strategies, and to a decrease 
of the relevance of the strategic reasoning itself. It also leads to a general 
organizational picture that sharply contradicts the mainstream rhetoric 
about Post-fordist companies.
8. CONCLUSION
It is worth repeating that our empirical results cannot be generalized in 
any way. Very different stories and case studies may be certainly found, 
since in the world of organizations there are surely many “exceptions” to 
whatever the “rule” is. However, the relevance of the companies in our 
sample (all major multinational companies) as well as the level of respon-
sibility and the length of experience of our interviewees (all top level 
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managers with many decades of experience in major multinational com-
panies) lead us to hypothesize that what we found about the dramatic 
relevance of financialization is not an unlikely coincidence. We strongly 
believe that in order to understand the current reality of enterprises, in 
managerial and organizational terms, it is necessary to rethink the way 
we conceptualize and explain the changes we are observing. Together 
with traditional explanations based on a logic of industrial rationaliza-
tion, it is worth considering the enormous pressure coming from afinan-
cialized economy. These changes do not necessarily lead to enterprises 
that are more “rational” in industrial terms, more “responsible” in social 
terms, more oriented towards long-term innovation and progress. On the 
contrary, it seems that a very different idea of rationality – indeed, a very 
different idea of “business firm”, is not only emerging, but winning out. 
This is a system-level phenomenon, not just because it involves all major 
listed multinational companies on a global scale, but also because it may 
well involve a vast majority of the business world. Even those companies 
that – because of their smaller size, or because they are not listed – are not 
under the direct pressure of financial markets, are nonetheless likely to 
be pushed towards the same financial “logic” as a result of cultural influ-
ences or, even worse, of their organizational ties with listed companies. 
This is also a subject that should be better understood through the collab-
oration of scholars from different disciplines – economics, sociology, man-
agement, organization theory, and more. In a way, this paper also rep-
resents a “call” to a more cooperative effort to bring up the issues here 
discussed to the public discourse and to help the scientific community to 
imagine ways to avoid, or at least to reduce, the many dangers and nega-
tive consequences that seem to be inherent to an increasingly financial-
ized economy.
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